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SEARCH OF THE NEWSROOM: THE
BATTLE FOR A REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
.MOVES TO NEW GROUND
The resolve of the press to advance claims of constitutional immunity
to subpoenas' and the presence of shield laws protecting the confidentiali-
ty of news sources2 have led law enforcement officials to seek new ways of
acquiring information from uncooperative journalists.3 One resort has
1. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); United States v.
Steelhammer, 539 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1976); Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va.
1976); Apel v. Murphy, 70 F.R.D. 651 (D.R.I. 1976); Branzburg v. Pound, 461
S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1970).
2. Twenty-six states now have shield laws limiting forced disclosure of jour-
nalists' confidential sources and information. ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 370 (1960);
ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.150-.220 (1973); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2237 (West
Supp. 1974-75); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-917 (1977); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070
(West Supp. 1978) DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10., §§ 4320-4326 (Supp. 1974); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-119 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); IND. CODE§ 34-3-5-1
(1971), IND. CODE ANN. § 2-1733 (Burns Supp. 1973); KY. REV. STAT. § 421.100
(1970); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45.1451-.1454 (West Supp. 1978); MD. CTS. &
JUD. PROD. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1971); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.945(1) (1972);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.021-.025 (Supp. 1976); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §
93.601-1 to .601-2, .701-4.8 (1964 & Supp. 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to
-147 (Supp. 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 49.275 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-
21 to -28 (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-12.1 (Supp. 1975); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS
LAW § 79-h (McKinney Supp. 1978-79); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (Supp.
1977); OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 2739.12 (1954); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506
(Supp. 1978-79); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.510-.540 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §
330 (Purdon Supp. 1978-79); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 9-19.1-1 to -3 (Supp.
1975); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-113 to -115 (Supp. 1975).
For a comparative analysis of all but the Oklahoma act, see Comment,
Newsman's Priilege Two Years After Branzburg v. Hayes: The First Amend-
ment in Jeopardy, 49 TUL. L. REV. 417 (1975). Congress has enacted no statute
giving reporters a testimonial privilege in federal court, but the Department of
Justice has issued guidelines regulating employee requests for issuance of sub-
poenas to members of the news media. All such requests must have the express
authorization of the Attorney General. Department of Justice Order 544-73, 28
C.F.R. § 50.10 (1977). However, failure of a department official to obtain
authorization is no defense to a subpoena. See In re Horn, 458 F.2d 468, 473 (3d
Cir. 1972).
3. California police admittedly used the search technique because they
feared that the Daily would be uncooperative, and that a subpoena would give
"unnecessary notice" resulting in delayed acquisition of the evidence sought.
Brief for Petitioners at 18-20, Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press claims that Calfornia law en-
forcement officials utilized this method to avoid the state's shield law. 6 PRESS
CENSORSHIP NEWSLETTER 30 (1975).
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been to the ex parte search warrant process. 4 This procedure, which per-
mits police to seize now and litigate later, was upheld by the United States
Supreme Court against first and fourth amendment challenges in Zurcher
v. Stanford Daily.5
The case arose in 1971 when four police officers, pursuant to a war-
rant, searched the premises of a Stanford University student newspaper for
photographs of a clash between police and demonstrators. 6 Nine officers
had been injured in the fray, and police hoped that pictures taken by a
Daily photographer would help identify the assailants. Photographic
laboratories, desks, filing cabinets and waste paper baskets were searched,
and although locked drawers and rooms were not opened, the officers had
the opportunity to read confidential notes and correspondence. 7 They
found only photographs which had already been published, and left
empty-handed.
The Daily and members of its staff sued for injunctive and declaratory
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,8 alleging that the search had deprived
them, under color of state law, of rights secured by the first, fourth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. The district
court denied the injunction, but granted declaratory relief.9 It held that
where material is sought from a third party- one not suspected of criminal
activity- a search is unreasonable per se unless a magistrate has before
him an affidavit showing that the material sought is likely to be destroyed,
or that a subpoena duces tecum is otherwise "impractical." 10 Further-
more, since first amendment interests in newsgathering, editing and
dissemination are involved, the court ruled that a media search should on-
ly be permitted in the "rare" situation where there is "a clear showing that
1) important materials will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdiction;
and 2) a restraining order would be futile.""1 The Court of Appeals for the
4. There have been at least fifteen incidents of search warrants issued
against the news media since 1970: thirteen in California, one in Rhode Island
and one in Montana. Information on these searches is available from The
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006. See generally Wicker, The Knock at The Door, N.Y.
Times, June 25, 1978, at E21, col. 1.
5. 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
6. Id. at 551.
7. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 127 (N.D. Cal. 1972),
noted in 86 HARV. L. REv. 1317 (1973); 19 WAYNE ST. L. REV. 1653 (1973).
8. "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
9. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 127 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
10. Id. at 132.
11. Id. at 135.
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Ninth Circuit affirmed per curiam, adopting the district court opinion.12
In an opinion by Justice White, the Supreme Court of the United
States reversed.'" The Court held that valid warrants may be issued to
search any property, whether or not occupied by a third party, when there
is probable cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities or evidence of
crime may be found there.' 4 When first amendment interests are involved,
it said that courts need do no more than apply the warrant requirements
with "particular exactitude."' s
Justice Powell concurred with the holding of the Court, noting that
fourth amendment procedure contemplates a magistrate's taking into ac-
count the constitutional guarantee of a free press.16 Three justices
dissented. Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Marshall, found the search to
be a burden on freedom of the press and thus violative of the first and four-
teenth amendments.' 7 Justice Stevens dissented on the broader ground
that the majority's construction of the fourth amendment threatened all
innocent third parties.1 8 Justice Brennan did not participate in the deci-
sion of the case. ' 9
In cutting short growing judicial recognition of a qualified constitu-
tional privilege for reporters, 20 the Stanford Daily decision has provoked
12. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
13. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
14. Id. at 554.
15. Id. at 565.
16. Id. at 568-70. See text accompanying notes 109-11 infra.
17. Id. at 570-77. Justices Stewart and Marshall would have upheld the deci-
sion of the lower courts, since a subpoena would have served the "legitimate needs
of government ... without infringing the freedom of the press." Id. at 576. See
text accompanying notes 101-02 infra.
18. Id. at 577-83. Justice Stevens dissected the fourth amendment,
separating the opening clause of the amendment, which sets forth the scope of its
protection, from the warrant clause, which regulates the issuance of warrants. He
argued that the probable cause standard historically has required a demonstra-
tion that "no less intrusive" method of investigation would succeed, i.e., if notice
were given the object sought would be concealed or destroyed. Justice Stevens
noted that prior to Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), cases interpreting
the fourth amendment drew a distinction between "mere evidence" of crime,
which could not be seized, and fruits and instrumentalities, which could. In those
cases, he said, it was the "probability of criminal culpability" which justified the
fear of evidence destruction. In the post-Hayden era then, he reasoned, "the only
conceivable justification for an unannounced invasion of a citizen's privacy is a
showing of some reasonable basis for a similar fear."
19. 436 U.S. 547, 568 (1978).
20. In Branzburgv. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the United States Supreme
Court held, 5 to 4, that the first amendment does not relieve a journalist from the
obligation to respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer questions relevant to a
criminal investigation. It has never been clear, however, whether Branzburg
completely precludes recognition of a testimonial privilege for reporters under
the Constitution. A concurring opinion by Justice Powell, the swing vote, em-
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criticism 2' and may lead Congress to attempt a legislative reversal. 22 More
is involved in press search and seizure than a simple confrontation between
the first amendment and society's need to protect itself from crime. The
purpose of this note is to survey the considerations complicating the con-
troversy.
At least four distinguishable interests are involved in searches of the
news media: 23 (1) the right of the press, both as individuals and as an in-
pliasized that the holding was a limited one which did not abrogate the constitu-
tional rights of newsmen with respect to newsgathering. Instead, Justice Powell
said, a claim of privilege should be judged on a case-by-case basis "by the striking
of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens
to give relevant testimony with regard to criminal conduct." Id. at 710. This opi-
nion has proven to be extremely influential in subsequent decisions, to the point
of sparking what is perhaps a trend on the part of courts to sustain a qualified
reporters' privilege. See, e.g., Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973) (reporter need not identify source where infor-
mation not essential to plaintiff's case); Gilbert v. Allied Chem. Corp., 411 F.
Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976) (reporter's confidential sources privileged except
where the information is crucial to the case and not otherwise obtainable);
Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973)
(reporter's testimony privileged where enforcement of subpoena would have chill-
ing effect on flow of information to the press); Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951
(Fla. 1976) (reporter need not testify before a grand jury probing non-criminal
activity); Opinion of theJustices, 373 A.2d 644 (N.H. 1977) (senate president and
council, in proceeding for removal of director of probation, may not order a
reporter to disclose news sources); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A.2d 254
(1974) (newsgatherer may refuse to answer inquiries in a deposition unless there is
no other source for the information sought and it is relevant and material to the
issue of guilt or innocence); Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 775, 204 S.E.2d
429, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 966 (1974) (newsman's privilege of confidentiality
should yield only where criminal defendant's need for the information is essential
to a fair trial). For a discussion of recent case law in this area, see Comment,
Reporter's Priilege and the First Amendment, 23 CATH. LAW. 41 (1977).
21. See, e.g., Kilpatrick, High Court Ignorance Astonishing, K.C. Times,
June 8, 1978, at 23A, col. 4; Graham, Hallmark Of A Police State, St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, June 8, 1978, at 2B, col. 4; A Double Blow By The Court, N.Y. Times,
June 6, 1978, at A16, col. 1; U.S. Media Alarmed By High Court Search Ruling,
Christian Science Monitor, June 2, 1978, at 1, col. 1; Reston, A Letter To The
Whizzer, N.Y. Times, June 2, 1978, at 23, col. 1; Newsroom Search Ruling
Alarms Editors, K.C. Times, June 1, 1978, at 8B, col. 2; High Court Bars
Newspaper Plea Against Search, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1978, at 1, col. 5;Jour-
nalists View Press Search Ruling With Alarm, Police Praise It, St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, June 1, 1978, at 7A, col. 1; Raid On The Press, St. Louis Post-
Dispatch,June 1, 1978, at2B, col. 2; WhatA Punch!And The First Amendment
Is On The Ropes, Springfield (Mo.) Daily News, June 1, 1978, at 18, col. 1.
22. See notes 115-23 and accompanying text infra.
23. For a more detailed discussion of the four interests involved in media
search and seizure, see Note, Search and Seizure of the Media: A Statutory,
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stitution, to an expectation of privacy under the fourth amendment; 24 (2)
first amendment freedom to gather, edit and disseminate information;25
(3) the government's need for the power of search and seizure to provide
for the security of its citizens; 26 and (4) the need of society's dispute-
24. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Supreme Court has indicated that the
purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect individual privacy. "[W]herever
an individual may harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy,'.. . he is entitled
to be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
9 (1968), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring). The protection of the amendment is not limited to "the right of the
people to be secure in their ... houses" but extends to commercial premises. See,
e.g., Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 367 (1968); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541,
543 (1967); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931);
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920). If the press
organization is incorporated, the corporation itself has a protected right of
privacy. FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305-06 (1924). However,
"corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right
to privacy." United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Miami Herald Publ. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (1974) (Florida newspaper right to reply law unconstitutional because of its
intrusion into function of editors); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (dic-
ta recognizing newsgathering as constitutionally protected); New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (refusing to interfere with editorial discre-
tion by enjoining publication of the "Pentagon Papers"); Grosjean v. American
Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (state license tax upon newspapers selling advertis-
ing held an unconstitutional burden on freedom of the press); Wichita Eagle &
Beacon Publ. Co. v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
982 (1974) (editorial writer active in formulating, determining and effectuating
newspaper's journalistic policies properly excluded from employee collective
bargaining unit); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059 (9th Cir. 1972) (discuss-
ing all three interests in the context of a criminal contempt proceeding for failure
to answer questions before a federal grand jury). The guarantees of the first
amendment were perhaps stated most eloquently by the late Justice Musmanno of
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court:
Freedom of the press is not restricted to the operation of linotype
machines and printing presses. A rotary press needs raw material like a
flour mill needs wheat. A print shop without material to print would be
as meaningless as a vineyard without grapes, an orchard without trees, or
a lawn without verdure.
Freedom of the press means freedom to gather news, write it, publish
it, and circulate it. When any of these integral operations is interdicted,
freedom of the press becomes a river without water.
In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 273, 126 A.2d 679, 689 (1956) (Musmanno, J., dissen-
ting), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957). See generally Watkins, Newsgathering
and The First Amendment, 53 JOURNALISM Q. 406 (1976).
26. "The primary societal interest underlying law enforcement is 'security
for the person and property of the individual' from 'reprehensible conduct forbid-
den to all other persons.' . . . To the extent that the police are denied the use of
this technique, the prosecution of a given crime may become considerably more
difficult or expensive. Clearly the utter denial of access to this evidence when held
by the press could impose significant costs on society." Note, Search and Seizure
of the Media: A Statutory, Fourth Amendment and First Amendment Analysis,
28 STAN. L. REv. 957, 973-74 (1976).
1979]
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resolving forums, the courts, to be furnished with relevant information.2 7
The fourth amendment broadly secures the right of "the people"
against unreasonable searches and seizures. Although historically the
amendment has been primarily concerned with persons suspected of
wrongdoing, 28 it is clear that its protection extends to innocent and guilty
alike29 since the sanctity of a person's privacy is the controlling considera-
tion.a0 Few cases discuss the fourth amendment rights of third parties,
3 1
probably because these persons have little motivation to object to searches
and seizures when they are not suspected of criminal activity.3 2 Other
reasons for this scarcity perhaps include past reliance of law enforcement
officials upon the subpoena duces tecum, rather than the search warrant,
to secure desired information,33 and the fact that prior to 1967 the fourth
27. In order for the government to meet its responsibility of providing socie-
ty with a mechanism for peaceful resolution of disputes, courts have continually
espoused what Lord Hardwicke termed the "fundamental maxim that the public
... has a right to every man's evidence." 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (Chad-
bourne Rev. 1974). See New York Times v. Jascalevich, 99 S. Ct. 6 (1978); United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S.
421 (1932); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273 (1919). See also text accompany-
ing notes 72-75 infra.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d Cir. 1930) where
Judge Learned Hand said: "[I]t is only fair to observe that the real evil aimed at by
the Fourth Amendment is the search itself, that invasion of a man's privacy which
consists in rummaging about among his effects to secure evidence against him."
29. "The Fourth Amendment . . . guarantee of protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures extends to the innocent and guilty alike."
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948). See also Camara v.
Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699
(1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); Angello v. United States,
269 U.S. 20 (1925).
30. "The basic purpose of [the fourth] amendment, as recognized in
countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the privacy and security of
individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental officials." Camara v.
Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
31. Discussion of the fourth amendment rights of third parties is limited
almost exclusively to the question whether a criminal defendant has standing to
challenge an illegal third party search. Rakas v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978);
Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394
U.S. 165 (1969); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Three cases have
dealt with warrantless searches of third parties, the court in each case finding the
search to be unlawful. Owens v. Way, 141 Ga. 796, 82 S.E. 132 (1914); Newberry
v. Carpenter, 107 Mich. 567, 65 N.W. 530 (1895); Commodity Mfg. Co. v.
Moore, 198 N.Y.S. 45 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
32. For a good discussion of the fourth amendment protection afforded
third parties, in the course of which this argument is made, see Comment, Search
Warrants and Journalists' Confidential Information, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 938
(1976).
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amendment was construed to bar searches for "mere evidence," as oppos-
ed to "fruits and instrumentalities," of crime.3 4
But despite this paucity of discussion, third party searches, and par-
ticularly those of newspaper offices, raise serious fourth amendment ques-
tions. The principal remedy afforded the victim of an unreasonable search
and seizure-the exclusionary rule 35-is not available to a third party.3 6
Neither the individual searched nor the party against whom the seized
evidence is introduced at trial has standing to contest the legality of the in-
trusion.37 The result is that an innocent, law-abiding citizen has less pro-
tection against invasions of his privacy than does a person suspected of
criminal behavior. Furthermore, because of their necessarily broad scope,
it has been argued that searches of newsrooms and reporters' files violate
the fourth amendment's specific prohibition against general searches.3 8
34. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 578-79 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967)).
35. See Mapp. v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206 (1960); Silverthore Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920);
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). For an argument against the exclu-
sionary rule see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411-27(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). For an argument in favor of it, see Wolf v. Col-
orado, 338 U.S. 25, 41-47 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting). Recent decisions
indicate the rule may be losing some of its vitality. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 446-47 (1974); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974);
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
36. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 131 (1972).
37. Only the criminal defendant has standing to challenge the legality of the
search, and to have it he must be on the premises at the time of the search, have a
proprietary or possessory interest in the premises, and be charged with an offense
that includes, as an essential element, possession of the seized evidence. See Rakas
v. Illinois, 99 S. Ct. 421, 433-34 (1978); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223,
229 (1973). See generally White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and
Seizure, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 333 (1970).
38. The problems connected with a general search arise when police enter
premises with a search warrant that fails to describe with particularity the
materials sought. As a result, police rummage about, seizing any item which
seems relevant to the investigation. The Framers of the Constitution were familiar
with the problem of the general search, and it has been said that the case of En-
tick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765), which held that English officers
could not break into a citizen's house pursuant to a general arrest warrant and
search for evidence of libel, had a tremendous impact on the founding fathers
and served as the basis for the fourth amendment. Boyd v. United States,' 116
U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886). The Supreme Court, in turn, has sought to limit the
power of law enforcement officials to rummage by holding that the scope of a
search must be reasonable in light of the circumstances that warrant the initial
intrusion. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S 752 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282
U.S. 344 (1931); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). For an argument
that the fourth amendment was added to the Constitution, in part, as a protec-
tion against police searches of colonial printers, and that the Stanford Daily deci-
sion flies in the face of precisely what the amendment was intended to prevent, see
1979]
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Faced with these issues in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 39 the Supreme
Court held that "[n]othing on the face of the Amendment suggests that a
third-party search warrant should not normally issue. '40 Arguing that
search warrants are not directed at persons, but at"places" and "things,"
41
it reasoned that probable cause to believe incriminating evidence will be
found on the property to which entry is sought justifies the invasion of
privacy. 42 The Court discounted what it perceived to be the premise of the
district court holding-that issuance of a warrant is dependent upon a
reasonable belief in the culpability of the party to be searched 3 - in-
dicating that, if anything, "a less stringent standard of probable cause is
acceptable where the entry is not to secure evidence of crime against the
possessor. " 44 The Court rejected the argument that additional protection
is required to safeguard the constitutional rights of third parties because of
the unavailability of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent.4 5 It further
disagreed that general searches would be a problem "if the requirements of
specificity and reasonableness are properly applied, policed and
observed."46
The opinion may be a Pandora's box. As pointed out byJustice Stevens
in dissent, it exposes "[c]ountless law-abiding citizens" to unannounced
searches, and requires no consideration of whether the offensive invasion
Citizens'Privacy Protection Act: Hearing on S.3164 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978) (statement of Jack C. Landau of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press) (unpublished record).
39. 435 U.S. 547 (1978).
40. Id. at 554.
41. Id. at 555 (citing United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 155 n.15 (1974)).
42. "As the Fourth Amendment has been construed and applied by this
Court, 'when the State's reason to believe incriminating evidence will be found
becomes sufficiently great, the invasion of privacy becomes justified and a war-
rant to search and seize will issue."' 436 U.S. 547, 554 (1978) (quoting Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976)).
43. 436 U.S. 547, 555 (1978). "The critical element in a reasonable search is
not that the owner of the property is suspected of crime but that there is
reasonable cause to believe that the specific 'things' to be searched for and seized
are located on the property to which entry is sought." Id. at 556 (footnote omit-
ted).
44. Id. at 556 (citing Frankv. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365 (1959)). See also
Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).
45. "We reject totally the reasoning of the District Court that additional
protections are required to assure that the Fourth Amendment rights of third par-
ties are not violated because of the unavailability of the exclusionary rule as a
deterrent to improper searches of premises in the control of nonsuspects." 436
U.S. 547, 562 n.9 (1978).
'46. "Nor, if the requirements of specificity and reasonableness are properly
applied, policed, and observed, will there be any occasion or opportunity for of-
ficers to rummage at large in newspaper files or to intrude into or to deter normal
editorial and publication decisions. The warrant issued in this case authorized
nothing of this sort." Id. at 566.
[Vol. 44304
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of privacy is justified by the law enforcement interest it is intended to vin-
dicate. 47 Applied to the press, the principle is particularly reprehensible.
Two considerations need be noted. First, police acting pursuant to a valid
search warrant -may seize evidence of other crime that is inadvertently
found. 48 Second, police may enter and search a news office under warrant
when reporters and editors are absent. 49
Journalists must rely at times on confidential sources for information.50
During the production of a story notes and correspondence are filed in
their offices. No matter how specifically a warrant describes the material
sought, a search through all the journalist's papers until the documents
sought are found will often be necessary.-" During the course of such a
47. Id. at 579. The American Psychiatric Association has requested from
Congress corrective legislation because of "the significant implications of the
Supreme Court's decision in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily upon the confidentiality of
medical records, particularly those of psychiatrists." See Citizens'Privacy Protec-
tion Act: Hearing on S.3164 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the
Senate Committee on theJudiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) (statement of Dr.
Jerome S. Beigler) (unpublished record). An interesting editorial argument has
been made that in the wake of the Stanford Daily decision adequate legal
representation and absolute candor require the attorney to advise his clients that
their "secrets can be discovered by the police if and when a prosecutor or police
officer convinces a magistrate or judge that I might possess evidence of a crime
committed by you or any other of my clients." Conger, Will lawyers be giving
Stanford warnings?, 64 A.B.A. J. 1211 (1978).
48. See, e.g., Seymour v. United States, 369 F.2d 825 (10th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 987 (1967); Porter v. United States, 335 F.2d 602 (9th Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 983 (1965); United States v. Eisner, 297 F.2d 595
(6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 859 (1962).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Gervato, 474 F.2d 40 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973) (search of apartment pursuant to a valid warrant
made while the occupant was absent held not unreasonable).
50. The Watergate informer "Deep Throat" is, perhaps, the most famous
example. C. BERNSTEIN & B. WOODWARD, ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN (1974).
The authors, two Washington Post reporters who were largely responsible for un-
covering the White House connection to the now infamous break-in at the offices
of the Democratic National Committee, dedicate their book thus:
To the President's other men and women-in the White House and
elsewhere-who took risks to provide us with confidential information.
Without them there would have been no Watergate story told by the
Washington Post.
Id. at7.
51. For example, in Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal.
1972), the search was quite thorough. The district judge who wrote the memoran-
dum and order explained the overall situation in this way:
[N]ewspaper offices are much more disorganized than, say, the average
law office; a search for particular photographs or notes will mean rum-
maging through virtually all the drawers and cabinets in the office. The
'indiscriminate nature' of such a search renders vulnerable all confiden-
tial materials, whether or not identified in the warrant, and the con-
comitant threat to the gathering of news-which frequently depends on
confidential relationship-is staggering.
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search, perusal of confidential information is likely.5 2 If evidence of crime
is uncovered-whether or not related to the subject of the search-it may
be seized.5 3 Moreover, since police need not make the search in the
reporter's presence, the journalist may not have the opportunity to provide
his sources with even limited protection by cooperating with law enforce-
ment officials and delivering relevant materials to them. The practical ef-
fect is that the press is left remediless. Post-seizure access to the courts for
return of the materials is essentially futile- the confidential cat is out of
the bag.
For this reason, searches of news media offices interfere with the first
amendment right of the press to gather, edit and disseminate
information.4 A source who had wished to remain anonymous and whose
identity was disclosed as the result of a police search is going to be reluctant
to give information in the future. Other potential sources who learn of the
disclosure will be reluctant to come forward as well. Furthermore,
premature disclosure, even when not damaging to the source, "could
damage the developing story by putting targets on guard. 55 A pragmatic
publisher might well decide to kill a number of important, but relatively
minor, investigative stories in order to avoid the chance of a police search
that could expose the subject matter of a major story currently under pro-
duction. And, especially among smaller newspapers and broadcast sta-
tions operating on limited budgets, editors might discourage investigative
work by their reporters in order to avoid the expenses of litigation and
disruption to the news facility so often associated with searches and
seizures. The net result, of course, would be a diminution in the flow of in-
formation to the public.
Because of the importance of freedom of expression, the Supreme
Court has ruled that the first amendment modifies the fourth amendment
to require additional protections when both are involved in the same
case. 6 It has found constitutional violations where government regula-
Id. at 134-35 (footnotes omitted). In another case, police searched Los Angeles
radio station KPFK for more than eight hours in an unsuccessful attempt to find a
tape recording. See note 86 infra.
52. "It is irrelevant that the police are instructed not to 'read' or 'look close-
ly' at photographs or notes not mentioned on the warrant because a) it is difficult
to imagine how a policeman searching for a photograph or set of notes will not
'read' or 'look closely' at items not mentioned in the warrant and b) the major
harm to the press comes with the public knowledge that the police will be in a
position to see confidential material." Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp.
124, 135 n.12 (1972).
53. See cases cited note 48 supra.
54. See cases cited note 25 supra.
55. See generally Search Warrants and The Effects of the Stanford Daily
Decision, House Comm. on Government Operations, H.R. REP. No. 1521, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 4-6 (1978).
56. See Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973) (seizure of film
unreasonable because prior restraint of expression calls for a higher hurdle in the
[Vol. 44
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tions fell short of prohibiting the exercise of first amendment rights but
nevertheless "chilled" those rights by discouraging their practice.57 Fur-
thermore, the Courthas indicated that where the state has a variety of ef-
fective means to achieve a legitimate end, it must choose the alternative
which least interferes with first amendment freedoms.
5 8
The district court found the first amendment infringements involved
in news media searches to be serious. 59 It relied on the above doctrines, and
the Supreme Court's analysis in Branzburg v. Hayes,60 to reach its conclu-
sion that "third party searches of a newspaper office are impermissible in
evaluation of reasonableness); Lee Art Theatre v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968)
(search warrant for films issued on affidavit of police officer without judicial in-
quiry fell short of constitutional requirements demanding sensitivity to freedom
of expression); A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964)
(warrant procedures for the seizure of books constitutionally insufficient because
they did not adequately safeguard against seizure of non-obscene books); Marcus
v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) (procedure for issuance of warrant
without judicial determination of obscenity lacked safeguards to insure due pro-
cess protection to non-obscene material); Demich, Inc. v. Ferdon, 426 F.2d 643
(9th Cir. 1970), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 401 U.S. 990 (1971) (ex
parte issuance of search warrant for allegedly obscene films violated first amend-
ment); Bethview Amusement Corp. v. Calm, 416 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 920 (1970) (first amendment held to require hearing before
seizure of allegedly obscene films). See also NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449
(1958) (order requiring association to produce names and addresses of all
members held to entail the likelihood of a substantial restraint upon exercise of
the right to freedom of association).
57. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (applicant to
state bar need not answer question relating to Communist Party membership);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (state provision making
seditious words grounds for removal of school teachers held unconstitutionally
vague); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (law requiring
addressee to return a reply card in order to receive communist propaganda held
unconstitutional); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964) (statute requiring state
employees to take loyalty oath held vague and inhibitive of free speech). Note,
however, that allegations of a subjective chill on the exercise of constitutional
rights are not enough, there must be a showing of specific present objective harm,
or an immediate threat of specific future objective harm. See Laird v. Tatum,
408 U.S. 1 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
58. The Court has used what is commonly known as the "less drastic means"
or "least drastic alternative" doctrine to invalidate governmental measures which
impinge upon constitutional rights. See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S.
258 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960); Dean Milk v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951). The Court
has not, however, suggested what the alternative should have been in each of
those cases. See also Carroll v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S.
175 (1968). An analysis of the less drastic means doctrine in first amendment
cases can be found in Note, Less Drastic Means and The First Amendment, 78
YALE L.J. 464 (1969). See generally Struve, The Less-Restrictive Alternative
Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1463 (1967).
59. Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 134 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
60. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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all but a very few situations.161 For six years Branzburg had been the
prevailing opinion on the testimonial privilege of the press, and its logic
seemed to fit well the search and seizure situation. In departing from it the
Court has established unpropitious precedent.
Branzburg v. Hayes and its companion cases, In re Pappas and United
States v. Caldwell, dealt with the refusal of reporters to appear and testify
before state and federal grand juries.6 2 The holding- that the first amend-
ment does not give journalists a privilege to refuse to respond to grand jury
subpoenas and answer questions relevant to a criminal investiga-
tion6 3 -was a narrow one. It appeared to afford press newsgathering some
protection, but reasoned that the investigatory needs of the grand jury or-
dinarily establish a compelling state interest sufficient to overcome first
amendment concerns. 64 Indeed, Justice Powell, whose vote was necessary
to the Court's judgment, emphasized in his concurrence that "[t]he court
does not hold that newsmen, subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury, are
61. Because a search presents an overwhelming threat to the press's
ability to gather and disseminate the news, and because "less drastic
means" exist to obtain the same information, third party searches of a
newspaper office are impermissible in all but a very few situations. A
search warrant should be permitted only in the rare circumstance where
there is a clear showing that 1) important materials will be destroyed or
removed from the jurisdiction; and 2) a restraining order would be
futile. To stop short of this standard would be to sneer at all the First
Amendment has come to represent in our society.
353 F. Supp. at 135 (emphasis in original).
62. Branzburg involved Supreme Court review of three cases: Caldwell v.
United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970); Branzburg v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d
345 (Ky. 1970); In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297 (1971). Paul Branz-
burg was a reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal who wrote two stories on
illegal drug abuse which he had witnessed in his role as a journalist. He described
in detail both the unlawful use of drugs and the synthesization of marijuana into
hashish. 408 U.S. at 667-71. Paul Pappas was a Providence, R.I., television
reporter who was permitted by Black Panther leaders to view activities inside their
New Bedford, Mass., headquarters during civil disorders there. Id. at 672-75.
Earl Caldwell, a reporter for the New York Times, was assigned to cover the Black
Panther Party and other black militant groups. He was present on several occa-
sions when persons advocated violent revolution and the assassination of Presi-
dent Nixon. Id. at 675-79. The Supreme Court upheld the orders of the Kentucky
and Massachusetts Supreme Courts compelling Branzburg and Pappas to testify,
and reversed the Ninth Circuit, which had refused to order Caldwell to testify.
63. 408 U.S. at 708-09.
64. If the test is that the government "convincingly show a substantial
relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and
compelling state interest," . . . it is quite apparent (1) that the State has
the necessary interest ... and (2) that .... the grand jury called these
reporters ... because it was likely that they could supply information
to help the government determine whether illegal conduct had oc-
curred ....
Id. at 700-01 (citations omitted).
308 [Vol. 44
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without constitutional rights with respect to the gathering of news or in
safeguarding their sources. ' 65 Justice Powell said that a reporter, like all
other witnesses, would have to appear, 66 but indicated that he might
refuse to answer certain questions. If the grand jury pursued the inquiry by
seeking an order, the court would be required to balance press interests
against societal need on a case-by-case basis. 67 Generally, it is this balanc-
ing approach that has since been followed by lower federal courts in
newsmen's privilege cases. 66
The "limited nature" 69 of the Branzburg holding is highlighted by the
facts of the cases involved.70 Each of the reporters had actually witnessed
criminal activity rather than simply being informed of it. Their refusal to
even appear before the grand jury was a more sweeping claim of exemp-
tion than would have been a refusal to answer selected questions. The cases
involved infringement upon only one of several press func-
tions - newsgathering; and they did not present as grave a threat to fourth
amendment interests in privacy as did the third party search in Stanford
Daily.
The government has a responsibility to provide for the safety of its
citizens and to provide its adjudicatory bodies with evidence. It was the
65. Id. at 709.
66. "The newsman witness, like all other witnesses, will have to appear; he
will not be in a position to litigate at the threshold the State's very authority to
subpoena him." Id. at 710 n.1.
67. [N]o harrassment of newsmen will be tolerated. If a newsman
believes that the grand jury investigation is not being conducted in good
faith he is not without remedy. Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to
give information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the
subject of the investigation, or if he has some other reason to believe that
his testimony implicates confidential source relationships without a
legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have access to the court on a
motion to quash and an appropriate protective order may be entered.
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the strik-
ing of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation
of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.
The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-
by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating
such questions.
Id. at 709-10.
68. See, e.g., Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. dis-
missed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974); Baker v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. McCord, 356 F.
Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973).
69. 408 U.S. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring). For a discussion of the nar-
rowness of the Court's holding, see Comment, Search and Seizure of the Media: A
Statutory, Fourth Amendment and First Amendment Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV.
957, 976-78 (1976).
70. Subsequent cases have recognized the importance of taking such con-
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grand jury's "important role in fair and effective law enforcement" com-
bined with its "essential" reliance on the subpoena process that tipped the
scales in Branzburg. 7 Had the Court applied Branzburg's grand jury/sub-
poena analysis to the police investigation/search warrant situation, the
press would have emerged in a wholly different legal position with respect
to its rights to resist government evidence gathering efforts.
The grand jury is an integral part of the American legal system. 72 The
fifth amendment mandates indictment for serious federal offenses.
Although this requirement is not applied to the states through the four-
teenth amendment, 7 many states provide that certain criminal prosecu-
tions may only be initiated by indictment. 74 The subpoena is essential to
the fulfillment of the grand jury's function. Without it the grand jury
would have no authoritative means of acquiring testimony or commanding
the production of evidence. 75
Judicial supervision and procedural safeguards prevent the subpoena
from requiring the press indiscriminately to disclose its sources.7 6 For ex-
ample, a subpoena must be "reasonable. ' 77 It may require only the pro-
71. 408 U.S. at 685-96. See Comment, Search and Seizure of the Media: A
Statutory, Fourth Amendment and First Amendment Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV.
957, 978 n.123 (1976) for the view thatJustice White's opinion "should be viewed
as a monument to the importance of unfettered grand jury investigation into
crime, not as a gravestone over the rights of the press." The note, written before
the Supreme Court's decision in the Stanford Daily case, goes on to argue for
application of the Branzburg analysis to the press search situation.
72. See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688,690, 700. "Fair and
effective law enforcement aimed at providing security for the person and property
of the individual is a fundamental function of government, and the grand jury
plays an important, constitutionally mandated role in this process." Id. at 690.
See also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); Costello v. United
States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919).
For a particularly thorough discussion of the importance of the grand jury see
United States v. Smyth, 104 F. Supp. 283, 289-90 (N.D. Cal. 1952).
73. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
74. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n.25 (1972) (citing Spain,
The Grand jury, Past and Present: A Survey, 2 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 119, 126-42
(1964)).
75. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
76. Id. at 682.
77. See, e.g., Oklahoma Press Publ. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209
(1946); Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134, 143 (1928); Consolidated Render-
ing Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541, 553-54 (1908); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76
(1906); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-35 (1886). The fact that an
extremely large amount of records are sought will not in and of itself make a sub-
poena unreasonable so long as there is a significant relation between the
documents and the purpose of the inquiry. See Application of Certain Chinese
Family Ass'n, 19 F.R.D. 97 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c) provides: "A subpoena may also command the person
to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, documents or other objects
designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash or modify
[Vol. 44
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duction of documents that are relevant to the investigation, 78 it must
specifically describe the materials sought,7 9 and it may only order records
covering a reasonable period of time. 80 A subpoena is subject to prior
challenge. If a reporter believes that the information being sought bears
only a remote and tenuous relationship to the investigation, or would ex-
pose confidential sources without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he
has access to the court on a motion to quash.8 ' If appropriate, a protective
order may be issued.8 2 Finally, "the characteristic secrecy of grand jury
proceedings is a further protection against the undue invasion" of first
amendment rights. 83
Contrast this with the search warrant procedure. In at least four ways8 4
it more seriously infringes first amendment interests than the subpoena
the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive .... "(emphasis
added).
For a general discussion of the reasonableness requirement see Comment,
Search Warrants and Journalists' Confidential Information, 25 AM. U. L. REV.
938, 962-63 (1976).
78. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 203 F. Supp. 575
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
79. The subpoena must describe the materials sought with reasonable par-
ticularity. See, e.g., Oklahoma Press Publ. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208
(1946); Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1928); Hale v. Henkel, 201
U.S. 43, 76 (1906); In re Eastman Kodak Co., 7 F.R.D. 760, 762-64 (W.D.N.Y.
1947). A subpeona duces tecum may meet this requirement by simply
distinguishing between relevant and irrelevant materials. In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena Duces Tecum, 203 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
80. See Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928); Schwimmer v. United
States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833 (1956). As the period of
time covered by the subpoena lengthens, the particularity with which the
documents are described must also increase. See Application of Linen Supply
Co's., 15 F.R.D. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); In re United Shoe Mach. Corp., 73 F.
Supp. 207 (D. Mass. 1947). However, courts have upheld subpoenas duces tecum
covering long periods of time. See, e.g., In re Radio Corp. of America, 13 F.R.D.
167 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (18 years); Petition of Borden Co., 75 F. Supp. 857 (N.D.
Ill. 1948) (20 years); In re United Shoe Mach. Corp., 73 F. Supp. 207 (D. Mass
1947) (27 years). See generally In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 203 F.
Supp., 575, 578-79 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
81. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurr-
ing). See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 473 F.2d 840, 844 (8th Cir. 1973);
Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d 1059, 1079-81 (9th Cir. 1972).
82. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 710 (1972) (Powell, J., concurr-
ing).
83. Id. at 700. Justice White stressed all of the press protective
characteristics of the subpoena process -judicial supervision, prior challenge and
the secrecy of grand jury proceedings-in concluding that the subpoena's limited
harmful effects on the press were outweighed by its societal value. Id. at 700, 707.
84. The four ways in which a search warrant more seriously impinges upon
press interests than does the subpoena procedure contested in Branzburg is
discussed in more detail in Comment, Search and Seizure of the Media: A
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process contested in Branzburg, and it fails to serve as compelling a state
interest.
First, a search is a more serious invasion of the citizen's right to privacy
than the subpoena. Police are not bound to secrecy, and in executing a
warrant they may break, enter and even ransack if necessary.8 5 Second,
the inhibiting effect of searches on the willingness of informants to make
disclosures to newsmen, and the concomitant burden on newsgathering, is
far greater than that which Justice White found "consequential, but
uncertain" in Branzburg. 8 6 A search renders a journalist's pledge of con-
fidentiality impotent. If he tries to block the search, he may be lawfully
forced aside.8 7 Since the search need not be made in his presence, he may
be unable to limit its scope by voluntarily surrendering the materials.
While the warrant must describe with reasonable specificity the place to be
searched and the things to be seized, this limitation allows significant ac-
cess if the item is small and capable of concealment. Officers may rum-
mage through files, scrutinize their contents, and seize evidence of
unrelated criminality inadvertently found."" Informants whose names or
85. In executing a search warrant, officers are normally bound only by the
constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Penn-
ington v. State, 302 P.2d 170 (Okla. Crim. 1956). Moreover, in determining the
reasonableness of an officer's actions courts will recognize that often police must
act on a quick appraisal of facts without the benefit of the hindsight afforded
those reviewing the situation. State v. Johnson, 102 R.I. 344, 230 A.2d 831
(1967).
86. 408 U.S. at 690. At least two media searches have involved prolonged
scrutiny of news offices and police seizures of documents that were apparently
unrelated to the investigation. On October 10, 1975, Los Angeles police con-
ducted a no-notice search of radio station KPFK and, for over eight hours, looked
through all the station's files and facilities for a communique from a radical
organization that related to a bombing of a Los Angeles hotel. Station officials
gave police a copy but refused to turn over the original citing the first amendment
and the California shield law. Although the police did not find the original com-
munique, they rifled files and seized other documents belonging to the station.
On October 17th of the same year police using search warrants issued under a
criminal libel complaint seized the printing plates and layout sheets of the com-
plained of edition of the Los Angeles Star, a weekly tabloid. Later that night
police also seized twelve manila folders containing artwork, photographs,
editorial copy and address books from the Star editorial offices. REPORTERS COM-
MITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, 7 PRESS CENSORSHIP NEWSLETTER 30,
30-31 (1975).
87. "One need only ask what would happen if the addressee of a warrant
refused to allow the search to be conducted to appreciate the magnitude of com-
pulsion produced by a search warrant. Without the slightest hestiation his doors
would be broken down, he would be placed under arrest, and the desired
material would be seized. . . ." VonderAHE v. Howland, 508 F.2d 364, 373 (9th
Cir. 1974) (Ely, J., concurring and dissenting).
88. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (if initial in-
trustion bringing police into plain view of incriminating evidence is legitimate,
seizure is permissible); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (search may be
made for "mere evidence" as well as for fruits and instrumentalities of crime).
[Vol. 44312
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confidential information might be on record may justifiably fear exposure.
Third, searches affect not only newsgathering, but the media's editing and
disseminating functions as well.8 9 A search may disrupt a newsroom for
several hours, impede timely broadcast or publication, and impose extra
costs in the form of salaries paid to employees made idle or required to put
things back in order.90 As a result, the mere threat of a search may chill
newsgathering and editorial policy.9 1
Finally, search warrants lack the judicial supervision and procedural
safeguards relied upon by the Court in striking the Branzburg balance
against the press.9 2 Although there is judicial administration to the extent
that only a "neutral and detached magistrate" may authorize a search,9 3
upon examination the apparent protectiveness of this requirement fades.
Magistrates who are approached for search warrants often have a sym-
biotic rather than a supervisory relationship with the police.9 4 In some
jurisdictions they need not even be attorneys.9 5 The probable cause stan-
dard, while in theory more protective than the reasonableness require-
ment of the subpoena, is in practice somewhat less protective. While a
grand jury must show a legitimate need for the information sought in order
to withstand a motion to quash,9 6 a mere showing that an item is relevant
89. Branzburg dealt only with the "consequential, but uncertain burden on
news gathering" resulting from requiring reporters to respond to grand jury sub-
poenas. 408 U.S. at 690.
90. See note 86 supra. Factors such as these, not present in Branzburg, have
been held to constitute unconstitutional burdens in other cases. See, e.g., Miami
Herald Publ. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (Florida newspaper right-to-
reply law found unconstitutional because it interfered with editorial discretion
and imposed extra costs in printing and composing time and in materials). The
potentially high cost of libel actions has also been viewed as a threat to freedom of
the press warranting judicial restrictions. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964) (public official must show "actual malice" to recover for
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct.). See generally note 25 and
accompanying text supra.
91. See text accompanying notes 54-55 supra.
92. 408 U.S. 665, 700 (1972).
93. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
94. Cf. Thompson v. Stahl, 346 F. Supp. 401 (W.D.N.C. 1972) (contempt
power of a magistrate is not equivalent to the contempt power of a court).
95. See Search Warrants and The Effects of the Stanford Daily Decision,
House Comm. on Government Operations, H.R. REP. No. 1521, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 n.8 (1978), citing generally National Criminal Justice Information &
Statistics Service, "National Survey of Court Organization," (1973 and 1977
Supp.); National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, "Courts of
Limited Jurisdiction: A National Survey" (1977). Effective January 2, 1979,
"magistrate" in Missouri means associate circuit judge. RSMO § 482.155 (1979).
An associate circuit judge must be an attorney. MO. CONST. art. 5, § 21 (1976).
Prior law, however, allowed for non-lawyers to sit as magistrates. MO. CONST.
art. 5, § 25 (1945); RSMO § 482.030 (1945).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Branzburg v.
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Gilbert v. Allied
Chemical Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1976) (mem.); In re Grand Jury
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to a criminal investigation will justify seizure under a search warrant. 97 But
most importantly, search warrants are issued in ex parte proceedings lack-
ing the adversarial engagement that assures consideration of competing
interests in the subpoena process. When confronted with a search warrant,
the journalist is left with only the insufficient post facto remedy of seeking
return of the materials seized.98
On the other hand, there are societal needs which only the search war-
rant can serve that must be balanced against its more severe infringment of
first amendment interests. While police have myriad alternative means of
obtaining information, 9 when swift action is necessary to acquire crucial
evidence and the possessor will not cooperate, a search may be imperative.
It is, however, only in this limited situation where police fear imminent
destruction or loss of vital evidence that the search becomes as essential to
the police as is the subpoena to the grand jury.10 0
Justice Stewart argued in dissent that the concurring opinion of Justice
Powell in Branzburg properly interpreted the first amendment to require a
careful balancing of "vital constitutional and societal interests."' 01 Since a
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 991 (D.R.I. 1975); Baker v. F & F Inv.,
470 F.2d 778 (1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 966 (1973); Application of Cer-
tain Chinese Benevolent and Dist. Ass'ns, 19 F.R.D. 97 (N.D. Cal. 1956).
97. There must be a nexus between the item sought and criminal activity. In
the case of fruits or instrumentalities of crime the nature of the item itself provides
the requisite nexus. In the case of mere evidence of crime probable cause must be
examined in terms of cause to believe that the evidence sought will aid in a par-
ticular apprehension or conviction, and consideration of police purposes is re-
quired. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967). Probable cause exists
where there are sufficient facts to warrant a person of reasonable caution to
believe that the item sought is connected with criminal activity, and is presently
located in the place named in the warrant. See, e.g., Berger v. New York, 388
U.S. 41 (1967); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Note, however, that
factual allegations in the affidavit accompanying the warrant request may be bas-
ed on the observations of informants-even those of questionable reliability-if
there is a basis for crediting the hearsay. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257
(1960).
98. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra. The Supreme Court has ruled
that an action for damages will lie against a federal officer responsible for an
unlawful search or seizure. Bivens v. Six Unkown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388(1971). However, common law judicial immunity may insulate a magistrate from
liability for authorizing an unreasonable search, and the standard of "good faith"
may operate as a defense for a police officer. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547
(1967); cf. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (public school officials not
immune from liability if they knew or reasonably should have knovn action
would violate constitutional rights).
99. For example, observation, surveillance, tips, informers, access to public
records, and interrogations of victims, third parties and suspects. See Comment,
Search and Seizure of the Media: A Statutory, Fourth Amendment and First
Amendment Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 957, 991-92 (1976).
100. This is, essentially, what the district court decided in Stanford Daily v.
Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124, 135 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
101. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 575 (1978).
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subpoena would normally serve the "legitimate needs of government...
without infringing freedom of the press," Justice Stewart would have re-
quired a showing of probable cause to believe a subpoena "impractical"
before permitting a warrant to issue. 102
The majority, however, refused to engage in a new balancing of in-
terests. In the words of Justice White:
The Fourth Amendment has itself struck the balance between
privacy and public need, and there is no occasion or justification
for a court to revise the Amendment and strike a new balance by
denying the search warrant in the circumstances present here and
by insisting that the investigation proceed by subpoena duces
tecum, whether on the theory that the latter is a less intrusive alter-
native, or otherwise.10 3
Noting that the Framers of the Bill of Rights did not forbid warrants
where the press was involved, the Court said that prior cases "do no more
than insist that the courts apply the warrant requirements with particular
exactitude when First Amendment interests would be endangered by the
search."'10 4 It held that so long as they are properly administered, the war-
rant requirements themselves "should afford sufficient protection against
the harms that are assertedly threatened" by searches of newsrooms. 0 5
The Court was unconvinced that confidential sources would disappear or
that the press would suppress news because of fear of warranted
searches,106 and argued that a warrant to search newspaper offices for
criminal evidence involves no "realistic threat of prior restraint" since even
"presumptively protected materials are not necessarily immune from
seizure under warrant for use at a criminal trial."'0 7 Finally, the Court said
it could see no reason for requiring a prior adversary hearing because "if
the evidence is sufficiently connected with the crime to satisfy the probable
102. Id. at 575, 576.
103. Id. at 559. As in Branzburg, the Court failed to discuss the less drastic
means doctrine as a method of protecting first amendment rights, apparently
considering it to be irrelevant in light of its opinion that the first amendment does
not modify the fourth amendment when press interests are involved.
104. Id. at 565.
105. Id.
106. "Nor are we convinced, anymore than we were in Branzburg v. Hayes
that confidential sources will disappear and that the press will suppress news
because of fears of warranted searches. Whatever incremental effect there may be
in this regard if search warrants, as well as subpoenas, are permissible in proper
circumstances, it does not make a constitutional difference in our judgment." Id.
at 566 (citations omitted).
107. 436 U.S. at 566-67. See Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973). But cf.
A Quantity of Copies of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964) (procedure for
issuance and execution of warrant prior to adversary hearing on issue of obscenity
constitutionally deficient); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961) (war-
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cause requirement it will very likely be sufficiently relevant to justify a sub-
poena and withstand a motion to quash.
1 0 8
Perhaps Justice Powell's concurring opinion limits the holding
somewhat. As in Branzburg, Powell's was the swing vote, and his concur-
rence sets out factors that a magistrate should take into account in deter-
mining whether to authorize a third party search. Powell said the
magnitude of the proposed search, together with the nature and
significance of the material sought are "properly considered" as bearing
upon the reasonableness and particularity requirements of the warrant
process.10 9 Furthermore, Justice Powell said, "there is no reason why police
officers executing a warrant should not seek the cooperation of the subject
party in order to prevent needless disruption."'" 0 While he agreed that
there is no justification for the establishment of a separate fourth amend-
ment procedure for the press, the Justice did say that a magistrate asked to
authorize a news media search "should take cognizance of the independent
values protected by the First Amendment."'
Before closing, the Court noted that "the Fourth Amendment does not
prevent or advise against legislative or judicial efforts to establish non-
constitutional protections against possible abuses of the search warrant
procedure."11 2 The statement has been received as a virtual call to action
at both the state and federal level. California has already enacted an
amendment to its shield law dealing with the search situation. " 3 Similar
protective legislation is pending in other states. 114 Eighteen bills restricting
the issuance of search warrants were introduced in the second session of the
Ninety-Fifth Congress, "15 and the House of Representatives Committee on
108. Id. at 567. The Court further noted that "Fifth Amendment and state
shield objections that might be asserted in opposition to compliance with a sub-
poena are largely irrelevant to determining the legality of a search warrant under
the Fourth Amendment." Id.
109. Id. at 570 n.2.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 570.
112. Id. at 567.
113. An Act to Amend sec. 1524 of... the Penal Code, Relating To Crimes,
A.B. 512, § 1, 1978 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. 3586 (West) (to be codified as 51 CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1524).
114. See, e.g., H.B. 985, 10th Legislature, 2d Sess. (Alas. 1978); S.B. 529,
112th Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Ohio 1977-78); S.B. 1597, 162d Gen.
Assembly, Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1977-78). See generally States Act to Remedy 'The
Stanford Daily' Decision, 60 AM. NEWSPAPER PUBLISHERS' ASS'N GEN'L
BULL. 272 (1978).
115. See S. 3162 (Sen. Dole); S. 3164 (Sen. Bayh); S. 3222 (Sen. Dole); S.
3225 (Sen. Heinz); S. 3258 (Sen. Sasser); S. 3261 (Sen. Haskell); H.R. 12952
(Rep. Drinan); H.R. 13017 (Rep. Quayle); H.R. 13113 (Rep. Jacobs); H.R.
13145 (Rep. Drinan); H.R. 13168 (Rep. Fish); H.R. 13227 (Rep. Edwards); H.R.
13232 (Rep. Quayle); H.R. 13319 (Rep. Railsback); H.R. 13909 (Rep. Ander-
son); H.R. 13918 (Rep. Crane); H.R. 13936 (Rep. Sawyer); H.R. 14014 (Rep.
Quayle) (all 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978));
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Government Operations has issued a report recommending that legislation
be enacted "to curtail the effects of the decision in Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily. ,," 8 The President of the United States, after requesting the Justice
Department to review all proposed legislation for the purpose of construc-
ting procedures to safeguard first amendment rights,1 7 announced his
own proposal for remedying what the White House termed "a serious
threat to the ability of the press to gather information and to protect con-
fidential sources." '" s
However, there are difficulties in drafting appropriate legislation. One
is trying to determine what parties should be protected. Should federal law
protect all persons not suspected of involvement in the crime under in-
vestigation? If so, would it be encouraging criminals to conceal evidence in
the "sanctuaries" of third parties? Should it protect only the press? If so,
how should "the press" be defined? Should professional journalists have
special legal protections or should the same rights extend to authors,
academicians, freelance writers and pamphleteers? Another difficulty is
trying to determine what jurisdictions should be covered. While Congress
could restrict the use of search warrants by federal law enforcement agen-
cies, such legislation would affect only a small percentage of warrants
issued throughout the country." 9 It is an open constitutional question
whether the federal government can impose limitations on the activities of
states and municipalities where there is arguably no commerce clause rela-
tionship. 20 Since civil rights are involved, the fourteenth amendment may
imbue Congress with some authority in this area.' 2'
President Carter's proposal sidesteps a few of these problems by pro-
hibiting, with limited exceptions, searches and seizures of materials pro-
116. See Search Warrants and The Effects of The Stanford Daily Decision,
House Comm. on Government Operations, H.R. REP. NO. 1521, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1978).
117. See Carter Seeks Plan to Avert Threats to Press Freedom, N.Y. Times,
June 15, 1978, at A15, col. 1.
118. Carter Administration Stanford Daily Announcement, White House
Press Office, December 13, 1978, at 1, col. 1.
119. See Search Warrants and The Effects of The Stanford Daily Decision,
House Comm. on Government Operations, H.R. REP. NO. 1521, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 8 (1978).
120. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Congress
may not impose federal minimum wage standards on state and local government
employees). See also Search Warrants and The Effects of The Stanford Daily
Decision, House Comm. on Government Operations, H.R. REP. No. 1521, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978).
121. See Search Warrants and The Effects of the Stanford Daily Decision,
House Comm. on Government Operations, H.R. REP. NO. 1521, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 9 (1978). See generally Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Pro-
cess and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975); Cox, The Role of Con-
gress in Constitutional Determination, 40 CIN. L. REV. 199 (1971); Monaghan,
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975).
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duced in connection with any form of public communication "in or affec-
ting interstate commerce."1 22 The legislation would afford protection to
newspaper reporters, broadcasters, authors of books, and academi-
cians-in effect, anyone preparing information for dissemination to the
public. As for other third parties, because of the "complexities" involved,
the administration believes "that further study is necessary. 1 23
While the Zurcher v. Stanford Daily holding may be an unfortunate
one, it should be remembered that often the federal Constitution, as inter-
preted by the United States Supreme Court, is not the only applicable stan-
dard. 124 Free speech and search warrant provisions in state constitutions
may give broader protection, and could provide the advocate with a
valuable tool in this area. 125
WALTER B. MCCORMICK, JR.
122. The President's proposal has two major provisions. The first would pro-
hibit a search and seizure of the notes, photographs, or other "work product" of a
person possessing such materials in connection with a form of public communica-
tion "in or affecting interstate commerce." The second would require police to
exhaust the subpoena process before searching for or seizing "non-work product"
materials. Non-work product materials are defined as those which are not created
by or for the press, such as an extortion note or a film of a bank robbery taken by a
hidden camera. Each provision has limited exceptions.
A search and seizure of work product would be permissible if (1) the person
possessing the material has committed or is committing the crime under in-
vestigation, or if (2) immediate search and seizure is necessary to protect human
life 
.
.*The same two exceptions apply to non-work product material. In addition,
search and seizure of non-work product would be permissible if giving notice pur-
suant to a subpoena duces tecum would lead to destruction or loss of the
materials, or if a delay in obtaining them caused by review proceedings after an
initial court order to deliver the documents would threaten the "interests of
justice." Under the fourth exception the possessor of the materials would be given
notice and an opportunity to submit an affidavit setting forth the factual basis
underlying any contention that the materials sought are not properly subject to
seizure. Carter Administration Stanford Daily Announcement, White House
Press Office, December 13, 1978, at 3, col. 1.
123. Id. at 5, col. 2.
124. See generally Falk, The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate"
Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAL. L. REv. 273 (1973).
125. See MO. CONST. art. I, § 8 (protecting freedom of speech); MO. CONST.
art. I, § 15 (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures).
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